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WESTERN WATER LAW AND COAL
DEVELOPMENT
By A. DAN TARLOCK*
Since 1973 energy planners and developers have looked lovingly
at western coal resources as a solution to the problems of national
dependence on imported oil and gas. Many westerners have not re-
turned this affection because of fears that the demands of the Pacific
Coast, Southeastern and Midwestern states for electricity would sim-
ply be the final rape of the West for the benefit of other regions.
Thus, the relationship between western coal development and west-
ern water allocation must be approached from the perspective of two
macro-debates which relate to western coal development. The first of
these debates is that over the content and direction of a national
energy policy designed to achieve supply independence. The second
controversy involves the regional impacts of energy development and
what these impacts portend for deeply held values in the west.
Western environmentalists and farmers have often pictured the
costs of increased coal development in terms of dry streambeds, de-
stroyed wildlife habitats, "sun belt" cities denied the water to fulfill
their manifest destiny, a devastated agricultural economy and Indian
tribes denied the water that they need to progress economically. Pro-
ponents of coal conversion as an integral part of energy indepen-
dence have sometimes argued that there is a need to give the use of
water for coal development some form of preference; opponents of
increased coal development suggest the opposite and argue that the
use of water for this purpose should be rigorously controlled. The
thesis of this Article is that the impact of increased coal development
on western water allocation is significant but that the potential ad-
verse impacts have been overexaggerated. There is no justification
either for according water for coal development some form of prefer-
ence or for specifically restricting the use of water for this purpose.
Western coal developers must compete with other claimants under
rules which are becoming complex as new interests are protected in
the prior appropriation system. Coal developers will face competition
from western states and the federal government, which are increas-
0 Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
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ingly using instream flow protection mechanisms to promote regional
stability, and from traditional consumptive use claimants. However,
coal developers will not encounter unsurmountable problems in find-
ing needed water rights or in complying with water quality laws.
This Article will discuss the constraints that western water law im-
poses on coal development and will attempt to distinguish between
justified and unjustified constraints.
THE ROLE OF COAL IN UNITED STATES ENERGY POLICY
The Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri basins form a western
energy basket in which coal reserves abound.1 Coal is the nation's
most abundant non-renewable energy resource. It is widely distrib-
uted throughout the United States, and reserves exceed the demand,
but its use for industrial, commercial, and residential fuel has de-
clined constantly since World War II as cleaner energy sources, pri-
marily oil and natural gas, replaced coal. At the present time, the
major use of coal is for the generation of electricity: utilities produce
about forty-four percent of their energy with coal. Until the 1973 oil
embargo dramatically illustrated that the Organization of Petroleum
Export Council (OPEC) nations have the political power and will to
control the world price of oil and that the United States was depen-
dent upon OPEC oil2 for our energy needs, there was little'system-
atic effort to develop a national coal policy. Although eighty-five per-
cent of western coal is found on the public lands or controlled by the
federal government, the federal government had no incentive until
the mid-1970's to promote the aggressive development of public as
well as private western coal resources.8
I. Recoverable reserves for both underground and surface mining for the principal Up-
per Colorado and Missouri basin producing states (in million of tons) as of January 1, 1976
are:
a. Colorado 10,100
b. Montana 80,100
c. New Mexico 3,200
d. North Dakota 8,100
e. Utah 3,800
f. Wyoming 37,000
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE DIRECT USE OF COAL 63 (1979) [Hereinafter cited
as the DIRECT USE OF COAL].
2. See generally REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL OIL CRISIS, PAYING FOR ENERGY (1975).
3. The Department of the Interior's management of federal coal resources on public
lands or controlled by the United States through mineral reservations has long been controver-
sial. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ROLE OF FEDERAL COAL RESERVES IN MEET-
ING NATIONAL ENERGY GOALS NEEDS TO DETERMINED AND THE LEARNING PROCESSING IM-
PROVED (1976). In brief, after a 1970 BLM study, HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
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The legislative and executive branches of the federal govern-
ment have yet to clearly articulate a comprehensive national policy
for the development of coal resources. Nonetheless, a policy can be
inferred from the often contradictory goals of the recent federal stat-
utes regulating the production and use of coal to minimize adverse
environmental impacts and the statutes and executive actions
adopted in pursuit of the often professed but not yet implemented
goal of energy independence.' As the impact of the political instabil-
ity of most major foreign producers of oil has been felt, and as the
continued decline in our domestic oil reserves has become more im-
mediate, three independent, or at least less dependent, strategies are
emerging.5 Highest priority is given to the reduction of existing
levels of energy consumption by pricing oil and gas at their world
replacement cost and enacting mandatory automobile and building
energy efficiency conversion standards. The strategy given second
priority is the increased use of existing and abundant domestic en-
ergy resources, coal and nuclear power. The third strategy is the de-
velopment of new interim energy sources such as geothermal and
synthetic fuels, to be replaced in the future by solar power and
nuclear fission. This three part policy, with its current emphasis on
increasing the cost of energy, is under attack from consumers and
environmentalists as being inequitable and unduly dirty, and from
others for its failure to take even harsher conservation measures or
eliminate costly production constraints. Still, the'rough outlines of a
national energy policy are stabilizing.
Immediately after the 1973 oil embargo, a proposal to increase
the use of low sulfur western coal was the centerpiece of a federal
coal conversion policy which, along with the increased use of nuclear
FEDERAL COAL LEASES (1970) (unpublished), concluding that existing federal policies were
inadequate to encourage development of federal lands, the Department of the Interior has tried
to put into place two programs (EMARS I and II) to set leasing targets based on national
energy needs, but all long-term coal leasing has been blocked by litigation over the adequacy
of the environmental impact statement issued for the EMARS If program. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Hughes, 437 F.Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977) blocked all long-term leasing
pending the preparation of the final EIS, and has delayed implementation of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1970). The order was amended to
allow variances for limited equity situations and for federal research projects. 454 F. Supp.
148 (D.D.C. 1978). The history of federal coal leasing between 1971-76 is well covered in
Friedman, Coal Development on the Public Lands, (Aug. 23-26, 1976) (paper prepared for
University of Utah-Environmental Law Institute Conference on Energy and the Public Lands,
Park City, Utah).
4. THE DIRECT USE OF COAL, supra note I, at 337-370.
5. See Policy for Energy Program is Emerging After Lengthy Debate. Wall St. J., Feb.
27, 1980 at 1. col. 1.
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energy, would implement the second strategy. However, due to the
public's increasing unease over the costs of the Faustian bargain
struck with nuclear energy, the environmental costs of strip mining,
and a clean air policy which currently gives little credit to one who
burns low- as opposed to high-sulfur coal, increased western coal
production became a less important component of this country's en-
ergy policy. The debate over reactor safety and waste disposal has
resulted in a defacto moratorium on the construction of new nuclear
plants.6 Although the slow down in the development of nuclear
power may only be temporary, the current fate of the "nuclear
promise" has lent increased support to the argument for increased
coal conversion, if for no other reason than that the health and
safety problems of coal production and use seem more manageable.
In 1979 three major energy policy studies were released; two of them
urged the increased use of coal.7 The federal government has out-
lined an aggressive coal conversion policy,8 and the Department of
Interior has released a long-awaited report calling for the increased
development of federal coal reserves. 9
Energy consumption figures show that a substantial increase in
coal conversion and production is, however, more of a goal than a
policy in the process of rapid implementation. Recent projections
suggest that the basic energy supply mix will not change signifi-
cantly over the nexf decade. The mix is now oil, 44%; gas, 25%; coal,
just under 20%; and nuclear and hydroelectric, 8%. The "exotics"
(solar, wind, geothermal, etc.) scarcely register, and current projec-
tions suggest that at most "nuclear power and coal may pick up five
6. Two new reactors were ordered by industry in 1978 and these were the last new
orders. In 1979 not only were there no new orders but eleven previous orders were cancelled.
Eight new reactors were not granted licenses, and by the end of 1979 the percentage of elec-
tricity generated by nuclear power fell from 12.9 to 10.6 percent. Burnham, Inactive Reactors:
One Year's Toll of Three Mile Island, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1980, § 3, at 1. For a lucid
presentation of the technical arguments about reactor safety see Lewis, The Safety of Fission
Reactors, 242 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, MARCH 1980, AT 53.
7. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENERGY IN TRANSITION FINAL REPORT (1979);
COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS AND RESOURCES FOR THE FU-
TURE, ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE CHOICES BEFORE Us (1979) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE]. The third study, YERGIN et all, ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE
(1979), argues for primary reliance on conservation and the development of solar energy.
8. President Carter has proposed a Coal Conversion grant program, S2470, to displace
the use of I million barrels of oil by 1990. CCH Energy Management T 9342, March 20,
1980.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL YEAR
1979 (MARCH 1, 1980).
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percentage points during the decade . . . ."1 In an attempt to
change this projection, coal conversion has been articulated as a ma-
jor government energy policy, and increased production from federal
leases has been urged. While eastern coal is more valuable in terms
of heating value per ton and is closer to the centers of demand, east-
ern coal has a higher sulfur content compared to that mined from
the western region.
The President's Commission on Coal released a report in early
March of 1980 which calls for a change in the eighteen to nineteen
percent supply figure and argues that the increased use of coal could
take the place of two million barrels of oil a year, slightly less than
one-fourth of the amount we currently import, by 1990, with only
minimal increases in pollution levels." The Department of the Inte-
rior also released a study on March 1, 1980 which reported that one-
hundred million tons of coal were produced on federal lands in 1979,
a twenty-five percent increase over 1978, and the report predicts that
federal leases will produce more than 220 million tons by 1985."1
As with any policy, there are trade-offs involved with this gov-
ernment energy program. Coal and other forms of energy develop-
ment such as oil shale retorting and synthetic fuel plants threaten to
disrupt the economic and social stability of this fragile and sparsely-
populated region. Many farms which are economically marginal may
be abandoned as energy developers bid away water rights. Without
prior planning many small towns have become "boom towns" in an
era that does not appreciate a nineteenth-century Cripple Creek or
Virginia City.13 The use of water to promote environmental values is
threatened by energy development as substantial amounts of water
for consumptive uses may be needed. Though the water use scenarios
overestimate demand, there are many new and subtle water pollution
problems in addition to the traditional ones which occur when min-
ing wastes are dumped in a stream. To examine the consequences of
coal development for western water resources, this Article will de-
scribe the likely water quality and quantity impacts of increased coal
production and conversion, examine the major legal problems en-
countered in shifting water from existing uses to coal production and
10. Winter, Oil and Gas to Remain Firms Primary Fuels as New Sources Falter, Wall
St. J., Feb. 12, 1980, at 1, col. 6. With minor variation the same mix is reported in ENERGY IN
AMERICA'S FUTURE, supra note 7 at 71.
11. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON COAL (1980).
12. FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 9.
13. Little, Some Social Consequences of Boom Towns, 53 NORTH DAKOTA L. REV. 401
(1977).
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conversion, and discuss whether the use of water for coal production
and conversion need be given some sort of preference in light of the
"marco" perspectives of national energy policy, or whether it should
be restricted because of the scarcity of western waters for competing
uses. The enormity of this problem precludes a comprehensive reso-
lution to the debates now going on in the west and in Washington
over the future uses of western waters, but it is hoped that the ex-
plicit focus on the impact of western water law on coal production
and conversion will provide a clearer perspective for future debate.
WATER QUANTITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN THE UPPER COLORADO
AND MISSOURI BASINS
The Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri Basins are harsh,
often beautiful but vulnerable, arid regions of sparse population. Ge-
ography has forced dwellers of these regions to develop an economy
based primarily on livestock grazing with patches of irrigated agri-
culture, mineral extraction and energy resource production, and
tourism. Water is a necessary condition both to human life and to
the economic survival of this arid region. 14 The western states devel-
oped a law of water allocation to insure survival in dry country.
Now, coal mining and conversion are said to cause substantial water
quality problems and supply conflicts which the law of prior appro-
priation is not well equipped to minimize, thus, the law of water allo-
cation is severely strained.
The law of prior appropriation deals primarily with relation-
ships among holders of vested rights and not with public rights to
environmental quality. Downstream senior appropriators have some
rights to a clean stream as against upstream juniors, but downstream
juniors have little right to expect a clean stream from upstream se-
niors on the theory that the senior could wipe them out at any time
by taking all the water.1" In fact, recent pollution-related water
rights fights have involved claims by juniors against upstream seniors
14. See T. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 545 (1965) and K. TOOLE, MONTANA: AN
UNCOMMON LAND 139-166 (1959). For a concise discussion of post-World War II economic
development in the West, see G. NASH, THE AMERICAN WEST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
235-43 (1977). This physical imperative can, of course, be documented extensively, but the
influence of climate and geography on the history of the Far West is nowhere better summa-
rized than in our foremost western writer and "amateur" historian Wallace Stegner's introduc-
tion to his collection of essays on the West. W. STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATERS
9-43 (1969).
15. See C. MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 805 (2d Ed.
1979).
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who cleaned up the stream by removing silt" or changed the point of
discharge of sewage effluent rather than demands for clean
streams." Since the doctrine of prior appropriation was not designed
to deal with water quality issues, the production of water resources
has been guaranteed by state regulatory programs which administer
federal effluent limitations and other pollution standards, or by di-
rect federal regulation. These anti-pollution requirements affect coal
mining by increasing the costs of operations, and in some cases the
water quality requirements imposed by federal and state law on coal-
related operations may conflict with the rules which protect holders
of vested rights. For example, pollution standards imposed by the
Surface Mining Reclamation Act of 1977 go beyond the protection
of the integrity of a physical water supply system accorded by the
law of prior appropriation. 18
The quantity of water available for coal mining and use is a
function of the overall supply which is physically and legally availa-
ble to each region, coupled with the number of competing claimants
for appropriated and unappropriated supplies.' 9 This section surveys
the water quantity demands and quality impacts associated with coal
mining and use, the gross estimated amounts of the water available
in the two basins, the legal and economic problems involved in ap-
plying this water to coal mining and use, and the claimants who are
likely to compete for available supplies.
A. Water Quantity Needs and Quality Impacts
Today coal is primarily used for the direct generation of electri-
cal energy. After the coal is removed from the ground it must be
prepared to meet the customers' size, moisture, and mineral concen-
tration needs. In the West, coal is only crushed, while in other parts
16. A.B. Cattle Co. v. United States, _ Colo. -, 589 P.2d 57 (1979).
17. Cases from Colorado and Wyoming have recently held that downstream appropria-
tors have no vested rights to the continued discharge of treated sewage effluent so long as the
waste water was imported into the stream system into which it is discharged. City and County
of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47, 506
P.2d 144 (1972) and Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979). Wyoming has not
yet ruled whether an in-basin appropriator may treat its effluent by a process which totally
consumes the effluent. See State By and Through Christopoutis v. Husky Oil, - Wyo -, 575
P.2d 262 (Wyo. 1978).
18. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1, 1977). See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying
text.
19. The leading source of information on western water and energy development is
WHITE ET AL, ENERGY FROM THE WEST (EPA Report EPA-600/7/7077-072, July 1977). The
conclusions with respect to coal are summarized in Plotkin, Gold, & White, Water and Energy
in Western Coal Lands, 15 WATER RESOURCES B. 94 (1979).
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of the country it is also washed to remove mineral impurities. How-
ever, if coal slurry pipelines are constructed, considerable water is
needed for the beneficiation process. A description of this process
follows:
Preparation begins with impact crushing, followed by the ad-
dition of water and further grinding to a maximum particle
size of one-eighth of an inch. More water is then added to
form a mixture that is about 50 percent dry coal by weight,
and the resulting slurry is stored in a tank equipped with
mechanical agitators to prevent settling. 0
A pipeline transporting 25 million tons per year will require 18,400
acre-feet, a nice water rights package in most parts of the west. 1
When coal is burned directly to produce electricity, about sixty
percent of the energy in the coal is converted not into electricity but
into heat, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics requires that the
resulting waste heat go somewhere. Traditionally, this heat was sim-
ply transferred to the water used to cool the generators, and this
heated water was then discharged directly into the water source at a
temperature higher than that of the original cooling water. This di-
rect discharge of heated cooling water served as a potential source of
ecological damage, and, as a result, thermal pollution became a con-
cern which first emerged as a significant environmental problem in
1968-70.
Although the general adverse ecological impacts of the direct
discharge of heated water are well-known, the adverse impacts of
once-through cooling, unlike those arising from the discharge of SOs,
NO,, and CO, into the atmosphere,"! are site-specific. The Clean
Water Act therefore draws a distinction between thermal pollution
and all other forms of pollution by subjecting the discharge of heated
cooling water to the Act's general technology-forcing standards but
permitting individual plants to obtain a variance by showing that no
significant adverse environmental impacts are likely to occur from
the discharge." A Section 316 variance was obtained at the Sea-
brook Plant on the Atlantic Ocean in New Hampshire,"4 where the
20. THE DIRECT USE OF COAL, supra note 1, at 89.
21. Id. at 237.
22. Id. at 186-232.
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976). See, in particular, 33 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
24. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), opinion on
remand 597 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1979) cert. denied -. U.S.-. (1979). § 316 authorizes less
stringent effluent limitations than would otherwise be imposed if the point source operator can
still assure "the projection [sic] and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shell-
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receiving water is quite cold all year, but most coal-fired and nuclear
plants must install closed-cycle cooling systems to meet the best-
practical- and best-available-technology requirements. Closed-cycle
cooling is achieved primarily through the use of evaporative wet
cooling towers or cooling lakes, and these evaporative systems will
cause the largest consumptive use of water in the coal fuel cy-
cle-some 29,000 acre-feet per year for a 3,000 MW plant.25
The final consumptive use of water will be for reclamation. The
Office of Technology Assessment, using Environmental Protection
Agency figures for 3,400 acre-feet per year, observes that "water
also may be demanded for irrigation of revegetated surface mines,
especially in the West where reclamation is more difficult. The quan-
tities of water are comparatively small . . . but may nevertheless
become a public concern in arid regions where competition or water
is becoming critical."'"
Water quality impacts occur at all stages of coal mining and
use. Mining requires that the overburden be placed in soil banks
pending reclamation. In the West, the alkalinity of the soil does not
present a severe acid mine drainage problem, but mine drainage may
cause salinity problems because of the dissolution of soluable ions
such as sulfates and chlorides. The salinity problem is minimized in
the Northern Great Plains because water is used to irrigate salt-re-
sistant crops, but the problem is acute in the Colorado River Basin,
where most crops are more salt-sensitive.27
Additional degradation occurs when violent thunderstorms wash
substantial amounts of silt from soil banks into local streams causing
environmental damage and clogging headgates. Leaching from these
soil banks is another source of contamination. Strip mining, a com-
mon method of extracting western coal, may have substantial ad-
verse impacts on the quality of aquifers.
Mining and reclamation activities which affect surface and
ground water resources are regulated primarily by two federal stat-
utes which establish joint federal-state pollution control programs.
These statutes are the Surface Mining Control Act of 1977,2 which
is administered by the Department of the Interior, and the Clean
fish, fish, and wildlife in and on the body of water into which the discharge is to be
made .. " Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1976).
25. THE DIRECT USE OF COAL, supra note 1, at 237.
26. Id. at 236.
27. Id. at 235.
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1, 1977).
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Water Act," which is administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency. The former attempts to protect ground and surface water
supplies from impairment by deflecting mining away from water-de-
pendent areas such as agricultural alluvial valleys 0 and by protect-
ing the hydrological balance in the area of the mining." The re-
29. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 and Supp. 1, 1977).
30. 30 C.F.R. § 785.19 (c)(1) (1979) prohibits surface mining west of the 100th merid-
ian unless the Office of Surface Mining finds, inter alia, that the proposed operations will not
preclude farming unless the history of agriculture is insignificant or the pre-mining land use
was undeveloped range land use and the proposed operations will not materially damage the
quantity and quality of surface or ground waters in the defined alluvial valleys. See, Swift,
Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 From a Coal
Operator's Perspective, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 4-1, 4-34-49 (1979).
31. 30 C.F.R. § 710.15 (1979) defines hydrologic balance as follows:
Hydrologic balance means the relationship between the quality and quantity of in-
flow to, outflow from, and storage in a hydrologic unit such as a drainage basin,
aquifer, soil zone, lake, or reservoir. It encompasses the quantity and quality rela-
tionships between precipitation, runoff, evaporation, and the change in ground and
surface water storage.
This concept and its relative alluvial valley floors will be very difficult to administer because
the regulations attempt to formulate scientific standards on issues about which no consensus
exists. The general purpose of the hydrologic balance regulations is to protect land and water
users from two types of potential impairments which are neither well protected. by existing
federal and state pollution laws nor by the law of western water rights. 30 C.F.R. § 715.17
(1979) is intended to protect land and water users from numerous non-point sources of pollu-
tion such as erosion and leaching and from de-watering and the effect that this has on the
ability of groundwater users to economically use aquifers. For example, § 715.17(h) requires
that "[tihe disturbed area shall be reclaimed to restore approximate premining recharge ca-
pacity through restoration of the capability of the reclaimed areas as a whole to transmit water
to the groundwater system." This section must be closely coordinated with the law of prior
appropriation, for the hydrologic balance requirements could be interpreted to give ground-
water users greater rights than they enjoy under state water law. No area of western water law
is more confused than the law of groundwater, but groundwater users face impairment from
two principal sources: senior surface right holders and other pumpers exercising a correlative
right to lower the groundwater level without liability to senior pumpers who suffer increased
lift costs. See C. MEYERS AND A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 679-778 (2d
ed. 1979).
The fate of the hydrologic balance regulations is somewhat confused because of numerous
suits challenging various aspects of the Surface Mining Control Act. See REPORT BY THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SURFACE MIN-
ING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT (September 21, 1979). In Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F.Supp. 425, 14 E.R.C. 1055 (1980), order stayed pending
appeal, - U.S. -, 14 E.R.C. 1149 (1980), the district court held that the sections of the Act
which require the restoration of land to its original contours violate both the Tenth Amend-
ment and substantive due process. Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), the court reasoned that because the Act deprived the state of control over land use
and economic development in coal mining regions, the state was deprived of an essential attri-
bute of sovereignty. This holding is, of course, not applicable to the regulation of mining on
public lands. However, the case has implications for the West because on the substantive due
process issue the court lumped the hydrologic balance and slope restoration requirements to-
gether. The court held that "in the case now before us the facts are on all fours with Penn-
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quirements which the federal government may impose to insure
compliance with these standards are designed to protect the integrity
of a water regime beyond the protections afforded by the established
principle of the prior appropriation doctrine that all those who rely
on return flows may not be injured by a change of diversion point or
transfer.3 2 The costs that these requirements will impose is not yet
clear, but they are an excellent example of the integration of new
interests in western water law. All surface run-off must be passed
through sedimentation ponds which must be retained until the area
is restored. Discharges from sedimentation ponds are point sources
of pollution and thus are subject to the effluent limitations of Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit re-
quirements of the Clean Water Act.83 Effluent limitations have been
set for total dissolved solids levels and for acidity and alkalinity.3 4
In addition to effluent standards, point source discharges are
subject to receiving water quality standards set by the states subject
to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines. The impact
of receiving water standards on mining is illustrated by a recent case
from the district court of South Dakota.3 5 A mining company ac-
cepted an NPDES permit with conditions imposed to protect a
stream, designated as a permanent cold water fishery, into which the
mining company discharged through a tributary. To avoid compli-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon [260 U.S. 393 (1922)]." Accord, Indiana v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. 1769
(S.D. Ind.), order stayed pending appeal 14 E.R.C. 1785 (S.D. Ind. 1980). A full discussion
of Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n is beyond the scope of this article, but it
should be noted that the case appears to misunderstand Usery. The majority in Usery required
more precise interference with state functions than the district court found. See also Brown v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 566 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977). The logical implication of
the district court's holding is that all environmental programs which provide for federal stan-
dards and state enforcement are ultra vires, but it is not likely that Usery intended this result.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 865 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Two other district court decisions have refused to invalidate the Act on tenth amendment
grounds. Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. 1325 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Concerned Citizens for
Appalachia v. Andrus, 14 E.R.C. 2100 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
32. See J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY 230-62 (1968).
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
34. National suspended-solid limitations do not apply in Colorado, Montana, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming but will be established on a case-by-case basis. The
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency's discretion to treat the western states
differently was upheld in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 246-48 (4th Cir.
1979). The court also held that the Administrator was not required to take receiving water
quality into account in considering variance requests but that "elements of the environment
apart from receiving water" were relevant.
35. Homestake Mining Co. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979). See also
Weyerhauser Lumber Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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ance with the permit, the company attempted to upset EPA approval
of the state's water quality standards because the Agency approved
standards higher than those recommended in its guidelines, but it
was not successful. The court held that the Clean Water Act allows
states to set higher standards than those required by the EPA, and
that standards may be set without reference to economic or social
factors. Such water quality standards affect coal mining, since the
Office of Surface Mining (OSM) of the Department of the Interior
takes the position that no sedimentation pond may be removed until
the stored run-off meets applicable water quality standards. Al-
though it has been suggested that this run-off is a non-point source
not subject to the state water quality standards, OSM's regulation
has been upheld on the ground that it fills a gap left by the Clean
Water Act.3a
Coal mining does not require substantial amounts of water, and
the availability of water for mining is not perceived as a substantial
problem within the industry. As the preceding discussion illustrates,
the major water problems are quality problems. The use of coal to
generate electricity or to produce synthetic fuels does consume sub-
stantial amounts of water. With respect to the generation of electric-
ity, the Office of Technology Assessment reports:
The environmental effect of massive consumption of water by
powerplant cooling systems is twofold:
The amount of water available to dilute downstream
discharges is reduced, and water quality is thus de-
graded. This effect is especially evident in the Colorado
River, where massive water consumption (by agricul-
ture, in this case) coupled with substantial pollution
loadings have elevated salt concentrations in the River
to the point where desalinization plants are required to
keep water quality within standards. In critical water-
sheds, the physical quantity of water remaining in the
streams may fall below that needed to support the water
ecosystem. The recognition that this "instream use" of
water is a "beneficial use" within the legal system es-
tablished for allocating water rights is a recent one, and
thus protection of water ecosystems from destruction by
36. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 457 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978), ap-
peal docketed, No. 78-2190 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1978). See also Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Costle, 604 F.2d 239, at 252-53 (4th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 51 ]
WATER AND COAL DEVELOPMENT
sheer lack of water is a recent development. 7
Water consumption by power plants may be reduced by the substitu-
tion of dry for wet cooling towers. The issue is, as always, one of
cost. At the present time, wet cooling is cheaper until water reaches
$870.00 per acre-foot.
In addition to burning coal directly, technologies exist to con-
vert coal to gas. Considerable sums of money are being spent to
make synthetic fuel processes operational at costs comparable to
conventional fuel sources, and the Priority Energy Act of 1979,
which was defeated in Congress, would have created an Energy Mo-
bilization Board to put projects such as synthetic fuel conversion
plants on a "fast track" to expedite their construction. 8 Synthetic
fuels technologies such as Lurgi gasification, Synthane gasification,
and Synthol liquification have water demands ranging from an esti-
mated 17,500 acre-feet to 6,700 acre-feet per year. The Lurgi pro-
cess is the most water efficient because it utilizes the moisture pre-
sent in "wet" coal. The project director of "Energy From the West"
has argued that the water use efficiency of the Lurgi process, com-
pared to the direct use of coal for the generation of electricity, prob-
ably "should be interpreted to mean that coal gasification is prefera-
ble to electric power generation in the more critically water short
areas."39
B. Gross Supply Constraints in the Upper Colorado and Missouri
Basin
Each basin faces a different supply problem. A 1977 study of
the Upper Missouri Basin entitled "Energy From the West" esti-
mated that there are 12.5 million acre-feet available for future de-
velopment and that reasonable projections indicate that only eight to
fifteen percent of that amount will be used, even assuming that no
attempt at water conservation is made.40 There is, however, a site
availability problem. "[M]uch of this potentially available water
37. THE DIRECT USE OF COAL, supra note 1, at 238.
38. See note 103, infra.
39. Plotkin, Gold & White, supra note 19 at 99. A recent paper, Abbey, Water Use For
Coal Gasification: How much Water Is Appropriate? (Oct. 1979) (Informal Report LA-8060-
MS, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), argues that a guaranteed source of supply is a neces-
sary condition for any synthetic fuel plant but that "differences in process water consumption
are inconsequential to the economics of competing processes. For a given quality of coal feed
and production cost estimated, water would have to be valued at a galactic $66,000/acre-ft
before it would influence the selection process." Id. at 4.
40. Plotkin, Gold, & White, supra note 19.
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may be very expensive because it will have to be transported long
distances to development sites."141 For example, proposals are pend-
ing to take water from the Oahe reservoir on the main stem of the
Missouri in South Dakota and pipe it to the Wyoming coal fields. 2
Controversies may result from shortages in critical parts of the Yel-
lowstone basin, and the Yellowstone compact may bar transbasin
diversions.4
In the Upper Colorado River Basin many of the legal issues are
the result of one overriding factor: scarce physical supply of water.
In order to understand the potential supply problems one must un-
derstand the "law of the river"44 which controls the allocaton of the
great Colorado. Interstate streams must be shared among the ripa-
rian states by the law of equitable apportionment, under which the
Supreme Court oversees the proper allocation of water.4 5 Interna-
tional rivers must be shared among riparian nations by broad but
similar principles of international law." The Colorado River is cur-
rently allocated by treaty, compacts, federal legislation, and the Su-
preme Court decision in Arizona v. California.'7
The gross rights to make a consumptive use of the river are di-
vided roughly as follows: First, Mexico is guaranteed the right to 1.5
million acre-feet annually except in times of extreme shortage. 8
Mexico has consistently claimed that they have a right to 1.5 million
acre-feet of high quality water, but the claim has never been legally
adjudicated. Instead the Colorado Basin Salinity Control Council 49
assumes federal responsibility for the quality of water through the
construction of a desalinization plant and other water quality mea-
sures. Second, the river is divided between the Upper and Lower Ba-
sins by the 1922 Coloardo Compact. 50 Each basin has the right to
41. Id.
42. See Loble & Loble, The Rocky Road to Water For Energy, 52 NORTH DAKOTA L.
REV. 529, 531 (1975).
43. Yellowstone River Compact, Art. 10, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-903 (1979).
44. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
45. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
46. See Van Altstyne, The Justiciability of International River Disputes: A Study in
the Case Method, 1964 DuKE L. J. 307.
47. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
48. Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1974, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8, 1945).
49. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620d, 1543, 1571-78, 1591-99 (1976).
50. Colorado River Compact, November 24, 1922, 70 Rec. 324 (1928). Congress ap-
proved the compact in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617(l) (1976) on the
condition that California and at least 5 other basin states approve it; the compact became
effective by Presidential Proclamation on June 25, 1929, 46 Stat. 3000.
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the consumptive and beneficial use of 7.5 million acre-feet per an-
num, but the Upper Basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyo-
ming and Utah must bear the full burden of short years because the
Lower Basin has a preference in the form of a delivery guarantee.
The Lower Basin has the right to an aggregate ten year flow of 75
million acre-feet, and thus, Upper Basin state diversions cannot de-
plete the flow so as to result in deliveries short of this ten year aggre-
gate flow guarantee. Third, the Boulder Canyon Project Act of
192851 allocated the 7.5 million acre-feet among the three Lower Ba-
sin states in Arizona, California and Nevada, but the Supreme
Court interpreted this allocation in Arizona v. California2 to allow
the Secretary of the Interior almost unlimited discretion to apportion
the guaranteed amount in times of scarcity through supply contracts.
Fourth, the Upper Basin states apportioned the flow among them-
selves on a percentage basis in 1948.8 The apportionment reached
by the states and the federal government is not conclusive, however,
as Indian tribes are not subject to the compact allocations; thus,
those tribes with reservations bordering on the Colorado River may
upset the above allocation through assertion of their reserved
rights."
The Upper Basin states delivery obligations were "secured" by
Congress in the 1950's and 1960's by the construction of Lake Pow-
ell and other storage reservoirs on the Colorado tributaries. 5 Yet,
while the Upper Basin states can bank water for delivery in dry
years, the erratic yearly flows and evaporation losses insure that up-
stream storage will be no guarantee that the Upper Basin states will
be able to use their full allocation. Assuming that the Upper Basin
states have a delivery obligation of 8.25 million acre-feet (the 1922
Lower Basin obligation plus one-half of the Mexican burden), the
question becomes one of how much water passes Lee's Ferry, Ari-
zona, the measuring point. The answer has consistently been "less
than the drafters of the 1922 compact assumed," and the estimated
annual flow declines with each new study.
51. 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976).
52. 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).
53. The percentages are Colorado, 51-75%; New Mexico, 11.25%; Utah, 23%; and Wyo-
ming, 14%. Arizona, as a partial Upper State, is alloted 50,000 acre-feet per annum. Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, October 11, 1948, art. Ill(a), 63 Stat. 31, 32 (1949). The
history of the negotiation of the compact is recounted in Meyers, supra note 44, at 26.
54. See notes 71-80, infra.
55. Colorado River Storage Project, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (1976). See also Colorado
River Basin Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976).
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In 1976, the Lake Powell research project estimated the recon-
structed virgin flow to be 13.5 million acre-feet, a 1977 Department
of the Interior study puts the average yearly flow at 10.4 million
acre-feet, and a recent Office of Technology Assessment Report on
oil shale developments in the Upper Colorado River Basin bases its
water demand projections on the availability of 13.8 million acre-
feet."6 The implications for Upper Basin energy development based
on the continued support of existing beneficial uses are mixed. Ini-
tially, there were a number of assertions to the effect that the lack of
available freshwater supplies might seriously constrain energy devel-
opment in the Upper Colorado River Basin. However, a more recent
and more rigorous analysis of the welfare economics of allocating
water to coal conversion asserts that there are no technical con-
straints, as opposed to cost constraints on the production of electric-
ity with technologies (primarily dry cooling systems or hybrid dry-
and-wet systems) which virtually eliminate water consumption. The
study therefore concludes that "the future levels of electricity and
synthetic fuels [needed] in the Colorado River Basin are likely to be
much lower than expected several years ago."157 But it must be noted
that, in part, this conclusion rests on the assumption that much of
the energy needed for population centers growing on the rim of the
basin will be generated outside the Upper Colorado River Basin. Ur-
ban growth will stress out-of-basin supplies and increase pressures
for further transbasin diversions.
United States-Mexican agreements and the decision in Arizona
v. California only set the ground rules for the resolution of future
allocation conflicts. The allocation of water in the Colorado River
among all competing users can only evolve over time, since many
new conflicts are emerging. Such factors as the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's salinity standards,56 substantial Indian claims, and
unresolved compact interpretation issues are some of the important
potential barriers for energy development. For example, Article
56. Weatherford & Jacoby, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the Colorado
River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 171, 184 (1975); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AN
ASSESSMENT OF OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES 357-415 (1980). The latter contains a summary of
recent flow estimation studies.
57. Abbey, Energy Production and Water Resources in the Colorado River Basin, 19
NAT. RESOURCES J. 275, 313 (1979). Energy use constitutes only 10% of the total depletions
projected for the year 2000. Id. at 312.
58. The Environmental Protection Agency's approval of the standards adopted by the
seven basin states is being challenged by the Environmental Defense Fund. See Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 448 F. Supp. 89 (D.D.C. 1978), affd 578 F.2d 337 (1978) (per
curiam).
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111(e) of the Colorado River Compact provides that the Lower Basin
states "shall not require the delivery of water which cannot be rea-
sonably applied to domestic agricultural uses;"" and Article IV(b)
of the Compact allows water to be impounded for electrical power
generation but provides that impoundment for this purpose "shall be
subservient to the use and consumption of such water for agricul-
tural and domestic purposes, and shall not interfere with or prevent
such use for domestic purposes." 06 Commentators have pointed out
that these compact provisions raise the issue whether a Lower Basin
agricultural use has preference over an Upper Basin power use.0 1
CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF WATER FOR COAL PRODUCTION
AND CONVERSION
To promote the settlement of the arid west, the early settlers
developed a water policy suited to the Jacksonian vision and develop-
ment of an agricultural and mining economy. The law of prior ap-
propriation allows the first user on a stream to obtain a priority over
all other subsequent users and so on down the line. To insure that
access to available sources of supply would be available after the
choice riparian bottom lands were patented, this doctrine allowed an
appropriation to be applied to non-riparian land, and adopted re-
quirements such as the necessity to complete a physical diversion
with due dilligence to discourage speculation." The only restriction
59. Colorado River Compact, supra Note 50.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 56, at 197-98, where the authors
speculate:
For example, if and when California is actually limited to 4.4 m.a.f., could a Cali-
fornia agricultural user, who could not be served within the 4.4 m.a.f. limit, success-
fully enjoin the use of water by one or more of the Upper Basin power plants? One
commentator has argued that water can be withheld in the Upper Basin for power
use as long as the G.A.F. obligation is met, but the issue has not been judicially
resolved. The Secretary of the Interior did impose a ten percent reduction in Lower
Basin water deliveries in 1964 to facilitate the filling of the reservoir behind Glen
Canyon Dam. Provision was made for protecting Hoover Dam power contracts and
the reduction in flow was offset by subsequent deliveries to assure compliance with
the G.A.F.
If and when another actual conflict arises over the issue, it could pit Lower
Basin agricultural interests against Lower Basin electric power interests, since the
latter are developing and exporting much of the electricity generated by coal-fired
plants located in the Upper Basin. Unless the matter were to be legislatively clari-
fied in advance, the Secretary of the Interior most likely would decide the question,
perhaps precipitating a court test. (Footnotes omitted).
62. For a case where their requirements were construed to allow an energy developer a
reasonable lead time to complete a diversion, see Montana Department of Natural Resources
v. Intake Water Co., 171 Mont. 416, 558 P.2d 1110 (1977).
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on the applications of water was that the use be beneficial, and this
limitation, based largely on early irrigation practices, served to pre-
vent only the grossest forms of waste."
An appropriative right is based on use,6" not property owner-
ship, and thus a water right is subject to partial or total abandon-
ment or forfeiture from non-use. Except for some important restric-
tions water rights are alienable. The system of primarily private
water rights originally served the west well, but the law of prior ap-
propriation is now under considerable stress because of the demands
for water for urban growth and energy development. This tension
potentially both promotes and hinders coal development.
The strength of the law of prior appropriation in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries is often said to be the chief
weakness in the late twentieth century. Water was allocated among
a large number of agricultural users. As a result, today this water is
used for crops of widely varying values and many streams are "over-
appropriated" with many owners of decreed rights not receiving any
water in a lean year. Energy users need a guaranteed right to large
amounts of water during dry years and thus have a strong interest in
a water law which maximizes the fungibility of the resource. The
existing pattern of many small vested rights and the resulting over-
appropriation of many streams makes it difficult but not impossible
to assemble a sufficient water rights package. 6 There is considerable
interest at the federal level, and to a lesser extent at the state level,
in making water rights more fungible, but there are also counter-
63. See Note, Water Waste-Ascertainment and Abatement, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 449.
A frequently cited example of the ineffectiveness of the beneficial use doctrine is City of
Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 799 (1955), in which the
court refused to enjoin a use which sustained transportation losses along a 118 mile ditch
which ran as high as 74% of the water originally diverted.
64. P. MAXFIELD, R. DIETERICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON INDI-
ANA LANDS, 209 (1977).
65. See Clyde, Current Problems-Legal Overview, Water Acquisition for Mineral Devel-
opment Institute, Paper No. 2, at 2-2-2-5 (A one-volume looseleaf collection of papers
printed by the Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn., 1978). A Wyoming attorney has advised energy
developers that "[g]enerally speaking though many streams are overappropriated because of
applications and permits in excess of the available supply of water in the stream, unless the
construction of all facilities of prior application has actually been completed and it is an indis-
putable fact that there is no surplus water available at any time in the stream, only then will
the State Engineer take the extreme measure of rejecting an application on the grounds [sic]
that there is no unappropriated water available. Thus, the usual overappropriation situation
does not cause the State Engineer to reject the application." Kirvin, Application for New
Surface Water Appropriation and Acquisition of Existing Surface Water Appropriation,
Water Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute, Paper No. 4, at 4-1, 4-8 (A one-volume
looseleaf collection of papers printed by the Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn., 1978.)
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pressures for non-market allocations.
Because the law of prior appropriation is a law of private prop-
erty rights, declarations of state ownership or trusteeship serve only
to provide a rationale for state regulation of the ground rules for
obtaining a private right. There had been no recognition of public
rights for purposes such as fish and wildlife protection, aesthetic en-
joyment, and recreation. Today, concern over the preservation of the
unique heritage of the West has led to the recognition of public
rights for in-stream flow preservation and to imposition of higher
standards on new appropriation applications. In recent years the res-
ervation of water in place for public enjoyment has been held to be a
beneficial use and many states have mechanisms to permit the sys-
tematic reservation of water for in-stream uses. In places such as the
Yellowstone basin in Montana a conflict between energy develop-
ment and environmental protection has arisen in connection with ad-
ministrative proceedings to reserve water from appropriation."
To make more water available for energy development, urban
growth, and environmental quality enhancement, the federal govern-
ment launched a water policy program in 1977-7867 which sought in
part to promote a variety of ground and surface water conservation
strategies. States have not been uninterested in water conservation
but still think of conservation primarily in terms of storage rather
than use reduction." At the same time that the federal government,
and to a lesser extent the state governments, are moving to allocate
more water to environmental uses and debating conservation strate-
gies, the Indian tribes, which have rights which are not dependent on
congressional, executive, or state largesse, are moving aggressively to
claim their share of western waters for uses from coal development
to preservation of their cultural heritage.
Coal developers must operate in this changing and increasingly
complex water allocation environment. In general, coal developers
benefit from the conservation measures such as increased irrigation
efficiency practices and pricing policies which encourage conserva-
tion, and from moves to make water more freely alienable, since en-
ergy developers are in a favorable financial position to bid for new
supplies or to reallocate water through the market for energy devel-
opment. Yet coal developers face competition from Indians, environ-
66. See note 133 infra.
67. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1043-51 (June 6, 1978).
68. Matheson, President Carter's Water Policy: Partnership or Preemption, 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-12 (1979).
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mental interests and municipalities which have preference rights to
obtain water to serve their growing populations caused in substantial
part by the western energy boom. This section of the Article will
survey the constraints that state and federal statutes and doctrines
which operate to withdraw water from appropriation for uses impose
on coal development.
A. Federal Proprietary Rights
Although most western waters are allocated pursuant to state
law, the federal government as proprietor of the retained public
lands and as a superior sovereign has the right to use some western
waters independent of state allocations. The federal government may
make three types of claims: (1) Indian reserved rights, (2) non-In-
dian reserved rights for reserved federal lands, and (3) non-reserved
federal water rights. Reserved rights were first recognized by the Su-
preme Court for the benefit of Indian tribes in 1907, and were ex-
pressly extended to public lands in 1963.69 The scope of non-Indian
rights were drastically narrowed by the Supreme Court in the 1978
decision of United States v. New Mexico.70 As a result, the Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior has issued an opinion which tries
as best as possible to ignore New Mexico by asserting the federal
government's right to condemn water rights to carry out Congres-
sional public land management policies and to appropriate, without
reference to state law, unappropriated waters to carry out these
management policies. 7 1 All of these federal proprietary rights both
negatively and positively affect the availability of water for coal
mining.
1. Indian Reserved Rights
In 1907, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Winters v.
United States7 2 that the federal government may claim water rights
for the benefit of Indian reservations to fulfill its trusteeship or ward-
ship obligations. One explanation of the reserved rights doctrine is
that federal water rights are based on Congress's power to vest in the
federal government the riparian rights which arise because of federal
69. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1907); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
70. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
71. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bu-
reau of Reclamation, and the Bureau of Land Management, Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914
(June 25, 1979) (Hereinafter cited as Opinion No. M-36914).
72. 207 U.S. 564 (1907).
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ownership of the public domain. However, since Congress did not
claim these riparian rights prior to their recognition by the Supreme
Court, the best explanation of this doctrine is that reserved rights
are judicially created federal rights in which Congress has acqui-
esced over a long period of time. Unlike state-created appropriation
rights, reserved rights are not dependent on use and thus may be
claimed at any time and are not lost by non-use. The federal govern-
ment claims Indian rights on the theory that Congress or the Presi-
dent reserved the water as owner of the public domain when it set
aside by treaty or executive order various Indian reservations. The
Indians increasingly claim that treaties and other acts of reservation
establishment merely confirm aboriginal rights .7 The difference be-
tween the two theories relates both to the priority date and the scope
of the water right. Under the federal government's theory the prior-
ity date is the date of the creation of the reservation, and under the
aboriginal theory the date is time immemorial.
Because most reservations were established in the mid-nine-
teenth century, the difference between the two theories on the prior-
ity is trivial. However, on the issue of the scope of the right the theo-
ries may be more significant. The standard used to determine the
amount of water reserved is unclear. Arizona v. California 7  held
that irrigated acreage, which includes future potential use, is the
standard, but in United States v. New Mexico7 the Court held that
the standard is the amount necessary to fulfill the original purpose of
the reservation. This standard would limit uses to those in existence
at the time that the reservation was created. The federal govern-
ment, on the other hand, has argued that for uses other than agricul-
ture the standard might be "all possible uses, including uses which
appear in the future without reference to the purposes contemplated
at the time of the creation of the reservation. '176 This standard
makes reserved rights difficult to qualify but does allow tribes with
73. Support for the Indians' claim may be found in the Court's citation to U.S. v. Wi-
nans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), a case holding that a treaty confirmed Indian fishing rights. Subse-
quent federal circuit court cases have awarded tribes rights even thoughthere was no mention
of water in the treaty, Conrad Investment Co. v. U.S., 161 Fed. 829 (9th Cir. 1908), and when
the reservation was created by executive order, U.S. v. Walker River lrr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334
(9th Cir. 1939).
74. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). It has been suggested that Indians are entitled to enough
water to service irrigation projects with less favorable ratios than those required by the Bureau
of Reclamation, Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew. Federal Reservation of
Rights to the Use of Water, 3 B.Y.U.L. REV. 639, 659-662 (1975).
75. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
76. Ranquist, supra note 74, at 658.
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coal resources to claim that they are entitled to sufficient water to
develop these resources.
The original purpose offered by the Supreme Court to justify
Indian rights was the need to civilize the Indians by making them a
pastoral rather than a nomadic people. Under this theory, water
rights would be appurtenant to the reservation and limited to pas-
toral uses; under the aboriginal theory, rights would be limited to
traditional uses such as fishing. Both these theories would preclude
the sale of reserved rights to on- and off-reservation mineral develop-
ment. However, if the purpose of reserved rights is to give Indian
tribes the natural resources to become economically self-supporting,
and thereby obtain parity with non-Indians, it is reasonable to con-
clude that Indian water rights are alienable for on- and off-reserva-
tion uses, including. energy development, so long as the tribe is bene-
fited." A recent Washington district court decision, however,
Colville Federated Tribes v. Walton,7 8 held that reserved rights
which are appurtenant to allotted land held by an Indian cannot be
transferred to a non-Indian. While the issues in Colville are different
from tribal transfers of water for on- or off-reservation mineral de-
velopment, when the tribe plans to use the revenues to benefit the
reservation, the case does cloud the possibility of the use of Indian
water for mineral development.7 9
Although the issue of alienability of reserved rights is open, en-
ergy developers have been able to negotiate with tribes to obtain
77. The Supreme Court has held that water rights may be transferred when allotted
land is sold to non-Indian purchasers, U.S. v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1938), but no case
squarely holds that Indian water rights may be transferred to non-Indian users for on- or off-
reservation purposes for energy development. An Indian rights specialist has concluded that 25
U.S.C. §§ 2, 81 and 476 dealing with federal supervision and contracts with tribes provide
"[a] reasonably sound basis of inferential statutory authority..." for such transfers. Boyden
& Pugsley, Use of Indian Water Law Developing Mineral Properties, Water Acquisition for
Mineral Development Institute, Paper No. 5, at 5-15 (A one-volume looseleaf collection of
papers printed by the Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1978).
78. 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (D.E.D. Wash. 1978). See Dufford, Water for Non-Indians
on the Reservation: Checkerboard Ownership and Checkerboard Jurisdiction, 15 GONZAGA L.
REV. 95 (1979). The United States District Court of Oregon has refused to follow Colville and
holds "that a non-Indian successor to an Indian allocatee acquires an appurtenant right to
water for the actual acreage under irrigation when he gets title from his Indian predecessor."
United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336. 349 (D. Ore. 1979).
79. In ruling that Indian reserved rights do not apply to allottments owned by non-
Indians, the court stated:
The conclusion that water rights reserved for Indian reservations must be limited to
tribal members is supported by recent Supreme Court opinions which have articu-
lated a more restricted view of the concepts of reserved rights in general.
460 F. Supp. at 1328.
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water for energy development. The fruit of the negotiation is usually
some form of waiver of present claims, yet these waivers may be
more difficult to obtain in the future as tribes are split into pro-de-
velopment and traditional factions.8 ° In any event, rights based on
tribal waivers of present rights in favor of some form of future rec-
ognition of tribal water needs are subject to two deficiencies. First,
these rights are uncertain because the impact of Congressional ac-
tion on the scope of Indian reserved rights is unknown, and second,
waivers are subject to substantive, largely unarticulated, fairness
standards because the United States is trustee for the Indians."
2. Non-Indian Reserved and Other Federal Rights
In 1963 the Supreme Court held that the federal government
could claim reserved rights when retained public lands were with-
drawn from entry and reserved for a water-related purpose.8 2 Be-
tween 1963 and 1978, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine three
times88 but did little to delineate the standards for claiming non-
Indian rights. Numerous bills were introduced in Congress after Ari-
zona v. California to force federal qualification of all reserved rights,
but western water rights "settlement" legislation has never been en-
acted. With their long traditions of cooperation with state agencies,
federal agencies remain somewhat indifferent to the possibility of ac-
quiring and managing federal water rights and asserted non-Indian
rights only on an ad hoc basis through intervention in state court
adjudication."
Between 1978 and 1979, two events occurred which appeared to
simultaneously contract and attempt to expand the reserved rights
doctrine. These events created considerable confusion about the fu-
ture of federal non-Indian reserved rights. First, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. New Mexico,81 which sharply limited the
situations in which reserved rights can be claimed by announcing a
narrow standard for federal claims. In holding that the Forest Ser-
80. See Boyden & Pubsley, supra note 77, at. 5-17, 5-22.
81. Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Navajo Experi-
ence in the Colorado River Basin, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1976).
82. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
83. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colorado River Water Conserva-
tion District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States v. District Court for Eagle
County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
84. Report of Federal Task Force on Non-Indian Reserved Rights, Task Force
5a-President's Water Policy Implementation 22 (June, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Task
Force Report).
85. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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vice could not claim instream flows and water for recreation under
the 1891 and 1897 Organic Acts, the Court held that the federal
government must meet a strict two part test: the water must be nec-
essary to fulfill the original purpose of the reservation, and the water
must be applied to support a primary, not secondary, purpose of the
reservation. Second, as part of the Carter Administration's water
policy growing out of the Bureau of Reclamation (now the Water
and Power Resource Service) and Corps of Engineers "hit list," the
Department of the Interior is coordinating an effort to quantify all
the government's reserved rights and to integrate them into the day-
to-day operations of the mission agencies subject to a reasonableness
standard which encourages assertions of less than the full extent of
the government's potential claims. 86
In response to United States v. New Mexico and the need to
provide guidance for the initiate Task Force groups, the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior issued a long and controversial opin-
ion on federal non-Indian reserved rights. 87 The opinion sought to
minimize the impact of New Mexico by asserting two alternative ba-
ses for federal instream flow rights, condemnation and federal appro-
priation of unappropriated waters, without reference to state proce-
dural and substantive law. An inter-agency task force is currently at
work recommending methods of implementing the Solicitor's Opin-
ion on a systematic basis. The precise impact of the federal govern-
ment's new approach to reserved rights and non-reserved rights on
coal development is difficult to estimate since it will take years and a
great deal of money to implement the recommendations of the Fed-
eral Non-Indian Reserved Rights Task Force,88 and it is unlikely
that the necessary appropriations for a comprehensive quantification
program will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. However,
some form of new federal policy may replace the present approach.
United States v. New Mexico is onsidered by many to be a
cramped reading of the enabling legislation under which reserved
rights were sought, and of prior decisions of the Court recognizing
the reserved rights doctrine.' 9 However, the holding in this case is
now the law, and the issue becomes that of determining the impact
of the opinion on other future federal reserved rights claims. Beyond
86. See Task Force Report, supra note 84.
87. Opinion No. M-36914, supra note 7i.
88. The cost has been estimated at "about 120 million dollars." Task Force Report,
supra note 84, at 32.
89. See Fairfax & Tarlock, No Water For the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United
States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 509 (1979).
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the resolution of the Forest Service's claims under the two early or-
ganic acts,90 the majority opinion casts doubt on other reserved
rights claims by other agencies, such as the National Parks Service.
To shore up the reserved rights doctrine, the Solicitor's Opinion vig-
orously asserts the validity of the doctrine for claims by agencies
such as the Parks Service and the Bureau of Land Management. In
addition to various reserved rights claims, the Solicitor's Opinion as-
serts that the federal government has the power to appropriate unap-
propriated waters arising on public lands by reference to state sub-
stantive, and perhaps procedural, water law."
Non-reserved federal appropriative rights are claimed based on
the reasoning that "the United States also has the right to appropri-
ate water on its own property for congressionally-authorized uses,
whether or not such uses are part of any 'reservation' of land." 92
Such rights may be claimed under a much lower standard than a
reserved right because the former "right does not arise by implica-
tion from the reservation of land for particular purposes, but instead
arises from actual use of unappropriated water by the United States
to carry out congressionally-authorized management objectives on
federal lands."93 These rights are not dependent on the substantive
doctrines and policies of state water law since agencies of the De-
partment are advised to follow state procedural law "to the greatest
practicable extent,"" but the Opinion reserves the right to hold that
the federal government need not always comply with state procedu-
ral law. The possibility of substantial federal claims by federal agen-
cies such as the Bureau of Land Management, with no tradition of
claiming and administering federal water rights, is the most upset-
ting aspect of the Opinion to the Western states.
The western states fear the Opinion primarily because of the
Solicitor's almost casual reading of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). 3 FLPMA charts a new course
for public lands policy by mandating multiple use-sustained yield
management of the retained public lands, but Congress clearly did
not intend to alter the pre-1976 balance of federal-state control over
90. Creative Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976); Organic Administration Act
of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473 et seq. (1976).
91. Opinion No. M-36914, supra note 71, at 15-18.
92. Id. at 15.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 18.
95. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1976).
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water rights.9" Nonetheless, on the incredible ground that federal ap-
propriation of unappropriated waters is the status quo, the Opinion
concludes "that in FLPMA, Congress authorized the United States
to appropriate unappropriated water available on the public domain
as of October 21, 1976 to meet the management objectives dictated
in the Act."97 The examples listed are water for such consumptive
uses as recreational campgrounds, timber production, livestock graz-
ing, and "instream flows and other non-consumptive uses.""
Despite seventy-two pages of analysis, the legal foundation for
the assertion of federal non-reserved appropriative rights is not clear.
The Solicitor urges that this foundation is based on both the Prop-
erty and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution, and concludes:
[l]t is my opinion that, since Congress has vested (under the
Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877) only the public with the right
to appropriate unappropriated water arising on, under,
through or appurtenant to federally-owned lands under the
state law, the United States retains a proprietary interest in
those waters that have not been appropriated pursuant to
state law. The United States therefore retains the power to
utilize those unappropriated waters to carry out the manage-
ment objectives specified in Congressional directives ...
Any legislation enacted by Congress to accomplish manage-
ment objectives on federal lands preempts conflicting state
regulatiofis or laws as a result of the operation of the Prop-
erty and Supremacy Clauses .... 99
The Solicitor's conclusion rests on the assumption that Congress
only precluded the federal government from establishing a general
federal water law for private parties, but never precluded the federal
government from doing so for its own benefit. Clearly the federal
government has the constitutional power to establish a system of fed-
eral water rights; however, the issue is not one of power, but one of
intent. On this issue the Opinion is wrong. None of the cases or sec-
ondary sources cited by the Solicitor support his position, and the
conclusion misreads over a hundred years of history, congressional
action and Supreme Court decisions.100 The Supreme Court created
96. The Act contains the standard federal disclaimer of an intent to claim an exemption
from state water law, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(9) (1976).
97. Opinion No. M-36914, supra note 71, at 69.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 16.
100. A careful criticism of the Solicitor's use of precedents, especially United States v.
[Vol. 51 ]
WATER AND COAL DEVELOPMENT
the reserved rights doctrine to allocate waters to uses which would
seldom be recognized under state law. The reserved rights cases
taken as a whole manifest a sensible, if logically troublesome, effort
to integrate federal water rights into state law by treating a reserva-
tion as a federal appropriation with a long relation-back period.
The evidence of some congressional intent to reserve, however,
is crucial to the accommodation of federal and state interests. Con-
gress has acquiesced in the limited use of the reservation doctrine,
but has never shown any desire to develop a federal system of water
rights as it clearly could have done under the Property Clause. In-
stead, Congress has expressed a preference for state allocation unless
a strong federal interest required a contrary result. If the three acts
of 1866, 1870, and 1877101 and the Supreme Court decision in Cali-
fornia Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.101 mean
anything, they mean that western waters will be allocated by state
law unless Congress finds that the federal interest requires an alloca-
tion not recognized by state law. To treat the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 in such a manner demonstrates a
complete unwillingness on the part of the Solicitor to follow the basic
framework of federal-state water rights which has evolved over time.
Energy developers will also be interested in the sections of the
Solicitor's Opinion dealing with reserved rights claims by federal
permittees and licensees. United States v. New Mexico refused to
recognize reserved rights for Forest Service stock grazing permittees,
and the Opinion extended this denial to the Taylor Grazing Act and
oil shale lease permits. The reason for both decisions is that the non-
Indian reserved rights had traditionally been limited to that amount
of water needed to manage specific federal lands for the benefit of
the public generally, not for beneficiaries of federal public domain
policies. This is a sound basis on which to deny federal water rights.
Congress recently refused to claim federal water rights for projects
subject to the priority mobilization board or for coal slurry pipeline
permittees, thus indicating that there is no national interest at the
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979), is found in Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights, 15 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 67
(1980).
101. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866); Amending Act of July 9, 1870,
ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1870); Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 197, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
102. In California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. 142, at 158 (1935), the Court said that
the language of the 1877 Desert Land Act "effected a severance of all waters upon the public
domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself." Id. at 158.
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present time to justify overriding state water law. 103
B. Coal Slurry Pipelines and Appropriation Withdrawals
Coal slurry pipelines are a promising technology to move coal to
areas of high demand. There is currently one operating slurry pipe-
line from the Black Mesa mine in northern Arizona to the Mojave
-power plant in southern Nevada, a distance of 273 miles. Pipelines
have been proposed for the major Rocky Mountain coal producing
states of Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. Pipelines are said
to be economically efficient compared to rail transportation, and
water efficient in the arid states compared to mine mouth generation
plants. However, the railroads have been set to block the entry of
pipelines into the market by refusing to grant the necessary rights of
way at the same time that they have raised rates which threaten to
make coal an economically unattractive alternate source of energy.
One pipeline company has recently won two significant federal court
victories on rights of way issues. In the first decision the court held
that the company can acquire the right of underground passage
under lands in which railroads hold an easement. 10 4 The ruling in the
second decision provided that where the railroads conveyed fee title
to alternate sections obtained under the Pacific Railroad Acts, under
which the railroads retained rights of way, the railroads did not re-
tain any subsurface rights to prevent the passage of the pipeline
under the railroad.105 However, because the railroads can still block
the pipelines which must cross land owned in fee, Congress is consid-
ering legislation which would grant pipeline companies certificates of
public convenience and necessity with a right of eminent domain
against railroad lands.106
Water availability is a necessary condition to operate a pipeline;
however, the two largest coal-producing states restrict the use of
water for a slurry pipeline. Montana simply declares that to export
103. Congress has expressly refused to preempt state law to give a preference to energy
development in the pending Priority Energy Project Act of 1979 (fast track legislation) and
the proposed Coal Pipeline Act of 1979. See REPORT TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND MI-
NORITY VIEWS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, S. REP.
No. 331, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979) and COAL PIPELINE ACT OF 1979, REPORT TO-
GETHER WITH SUPPLEMENTAL SEPARATE AND DISSENTING VIEWS, H.R. REP. No. 692 PART I,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 692 PART I].
104. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th
Cir. 1979). The two district court opinions were consolidated on appeal.
.105. Id.
106. See H.R. REP. No. 692 PART I, supra note 103.
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water from Montana for this purpose is not a beneficial use, 107 and
Wyoming prohibits the use of water for a coal slurry pipeline with-
out the consent of the legislature. 08 These statutes make it impossi-
ble or very difficult to transport water out of state, and thus poten-
tially violate the negative Commerce Clause doctrine which allows a
court to hold unconstitutional a state statute which places an undue
burden on interstate commerce. Western states have constantly as-
serted that because they "own" the water they can allocate to whom
they choose, but this argument rests on faulty logic.109
In Hughes v. Oklahoma'" the Court overruled Geer v. Con-
necticut,"' thereby rejecting the proposition that state ownership of
things ferae naturae was a sufficient basis for a state to prefer its
citizens to those of other states. Hughes squarely holds that all state
resource conservation statutes, regardless of the theory of state con-
trol of the resource, will be subject to the scrutiny under the negative
Commerce Clause, and probably implicitly overrules Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter,"' the one Supreme Court case holding that
a state may forbid the export of water out of state. Montana and
Wyoming would therefore have to defend their legislation on the
ground that the statutes are valid local conservation measures. This
would be a very hard burden to sustain, as prior cases hold that a
state may not discriminate against interstate commerce by forbid-
ding the shipment of the resource out of state,"' by restricting ac-
cess to the resource by out-of-state residents,"" and by preferring in-
state to out-of-state demands." 5
The risk of invalidation of Wyoming's and Montana's statutes
has been lessened, but not eliminated, by the proposed Coal Pipeline
107. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-867(2) (Supp. 1975).
108. Wyo. REV. STAT. § 43-3-115 (1977). The legislature approved one project subject
to gubernatorial veto. Wyo. REV. STAT. § 41-2-301 (1977). After extensive hearings, the gov-
ernor vetoed the project because of unanswered questions about its economic, environmental,
and social impacts. See F. TRELEASE, Water Law, Policies, and Politics: Institutions for Deci-
sion Making, WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE POLICY ALTERNA-
TIVES 199-201 (1980).
109. See Martz & Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The
Slurry Issue, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33 (1977).
110. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
!11. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
112. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). For a lucid analysis of Hughes, see Helterstein, Hughes v.
Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources. 1979,
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 51.
113. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
114. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
115. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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Act of 1979.118 In the face of considerable argument in favor of
some federal override of state laws, this proposed act rejects federal
assertion of reserved or appropriative rights as advocated by the
1979 Solicitor's opinion.1 17 Section 302(c) permits a state, in order
to "effectuate state public interest," to place restrictions on diversion
of water for coal pipelines.118 Under this Act, Congress clearly in-
tends to exempt statutes such as Montana's and Wyoming's from the
operation of the Commerce Clause and thus recognize the strong
state interest in the control over its water resources:
The position of the Committee goes beyond mere protection
of the water law of western states: it grants the states a cer-
tain degree of protection from possible Commerce Clause
challenges. It is the Committee's view that each individual
State in furtherance of its legitimate State public interests,
must have the ability to decide whether or not a coal pipeline
making use of a State's water originates in that State. A
State must be able to say "no" to coal pipelines; otherwise, it
could lose effective control over its water and, therefore, its
future. Thus the Committee, by the adoption of a number of
provisions regarding water law, has, within rather broad lim-
its, assured the States of the ability to reject coal pipelines,
116. H.R. 4370 (96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979).
117. H.R. REP. No. 692 PART 1, supra note 103, at 24-25.
118. Section 302(c) of the proposed Act provides in full:
State Water Permit Condition.-(l) In granting a State water permit or authori-
zation for a coal pipeline for which a certificate of public convenience and necessity
is issued under title II or a right-of-way is granted under title I, any State, to effec-
tuate a legitimate State public interest, may place terms or conditions pursuant to
State law, regulation, or rule of law on the appropriation, use, or diversion of water
for such coal pipeline.
(2) The establishment of terms or conditions to effectuate a legitimate State pub-
lic interest pursuant to State law existing at the time of the issuance of a permit or
authorization; or the exercise or enforcement of such terms or conditions; or the
termination pursuant to such terms and conditions of permits or authorization for
the appropriation, use, diversion or dedication of water; or the State law or laws
enacted so as to effectuate a legitimate State public interest (1) upon which such
terms and conditions are based or (2) which apply specifically or generally to coal
slurry pipelines shall not be deemed to prevent, unreasonably burden, discriminate
against, or directly negate interstate commerce even though in the absence of this
Act, such State law or laws of the establishment, exercise or enforcement of such
terms and conditions may be deemed violative of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.
(3) Once a water permit or authorization is granted by the State and accepted by
the grantee no term or condition placed thereon can be challenged later as to
whether any such term or condition effectuates a legitimate State public interest.
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or to accept them, and limit or condition their use of State
water. 119
The proposed legislation is clearly constitutional. Congress has
the power under the Commerce Clause to decide how the nation's
resources shall be allocated. It may appropriate resources under fed-
eral control for the benefit of all the states, or it may, as it did in
reversing a 1947 Supreme Court decision giving the federal govern-
ment title to the tidelands and their oil, 120 distribute resources selec-
tively to the states. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may
consent to a state statute which would otherwise impose an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce. 121
Congress has not, however, insulated state legislation limiting
the availability of water for a coal slurry pipeline from attack. To
qualify for the proposed Section 302 exemption, the state's interest
must be "legitimate." The House Committee Report does not specify
the standards Congress considered relevant to the question of legiti-
macy, but it is clear that lack of legitimacy is a litigable issue. At a
minimum there would seem to be some duty placed on the state to
justify giving the alternative uses of water a preference over coal
development, or to explain why the appropriation of water for a coal
slurry pipeline is consistent with the domestic water needs of the
state. Surprisingly, Montana's statute seems more consistent with
proposed Section 302, because it contains the inference that the state
needs all its water to fulfill uses that the legislature or the court has
found to be beneficial. Wyoming's statute contains no suggestion
that the water is needed for other uses in the state, and the require-
ment of legislative consent is a clear vehicle to allow the state to
discriminate between in- and out-of-state users. Neither statute can
be said to be per se valid under Section 302, although the declara-
tions of state interest that the section requires do not seem onerous.
C. State Reservations of Water
An energy appropriator seeking to perfect a direct flow or stor-
age appropriation for new supplies must now consider the possibility
that the right to appropriate may be foreclosed by reservations of the
119. H.R. REP. No. 692 PART 1, supra note 103, at 24.
120. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), was effectively reversed by the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1976). The federal government's off-
shore oil and gas rights are controlled by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 as
amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1976).
121. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). See generally Helter-
stein, supra note 112.
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water for instream uses such as fish and wildlife preservation and
recreation. States have two basic mechanisms to reserve water from
appropriation. First, all western states except Colorado have a per-
mit system, and most states allow a state agency to deny a permit on
public interest grounds."22 Second, in Colorado, Idaho, and Mon-
tana, state agencies may apply to appropriate or reserve water for
instream uses.
1. Public Interest Permit Denials
Traditionally, the two primary inquiries in appropriation pro-
ceedings are the availability of unappropriated water and the impact
of the appropriation or transfer on vested rights held by third par-
ties. The power to deny appropriations where the supply is available
has been sparingly used. Appropriation applications have been de-
nied to eliminate inefficient projects 28 or to preserve the available
supply for a major future federal or state project. 2 ' The power to
subject appropriations to a public interest standard is, however, in-
creasingly being used to condition storage applications to require the
release of water for environmental purposes. Because energy appro-
priations involve large and long-range commitments of water, it has
been suggested that such appropriations be subjected to comprehen-
sive evaluation because of the possible impacts of a present appropri-
ation on future claimants and on the public interest generally. Most
states require some form of water resources planning, and other
states have little NEPA's which require an environmental impact
statement to be prepared for large-scale appropriations.1 5 Courts
may impose similar planning and evaluation responsibilities under
common law doctrines.
In United Plainsmen v., North Dakota State Water Conserva-
tion Commission,'" the court ruled that the public trust doctrine
imposes some responsibility on the permit-granting agency to con-
sider the impact of energy appropriation on present and future water
demands.127 Plaintiffs asked for an injunction against all energy ap-
propriations until the requisite planning had been done. The court
122. See. e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-203.
123. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
124. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Ut. 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). See also, Big Horn Power Co.
v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. I110 (1915).
125. South Dakota requires that all appropriations in excess of 10,000 acre feet be
presented to the State legislature. 1975 Sess. Laws 275.
126. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
127. The court relied on Illinois Central v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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held only that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on the merits
because of the duties imposed by the common law public trust doc-
trine. Plaintiffs also argued that state legislation declaring a catch-
all water resources policy mandated that the planning report be com-
pleted, but the court refused to construe the legislation as imposing
such a duty, and also suggested that any duties rising from the pub-
lic trust doctrine fell short of those required by little NEPAs.'2 8 The
court noted that the public trust doctrine:
.. . permits alienation and allocation of such precious state
resources only after an analysis of present supply and future
need.
The Legislature has indicated its desire to see such plan-
ning take place, although not in mandatory language. Until
the Legislature speaks more forcefully, we think the Public
Trust Doctrine requires, as a minimum, evidence of some
planning by appropriate state agencies and officers in the al-
location of public water resources.1 29
Despite the narrowness of the holding, United Plainsmen sug-
gests that a state agency with the discretion to deny an application
when unappropriated water is available has some minimal duty to
consider the long-range impacts of energy appropriations and to
compare the value of water for energy development with a reasona-
ble range of alternative uses.
2. Instream Use Appropriations and Reservations
State appropriations and reservations for instream uses are fast
becoming an integral part of western water law. At one time neither
private individuals nor the state could appropriate water for instream
uses. Leaving water in place was simply not a beneficial use, as the
custom of the region had come to define the term. The requirement
that an actual diversion be made was fatal to instream use claims,
and courts seldom reached the issue of whether the use was benefi-
cial. 180 A recent California appellate court decision holds that pri-
vate individuals may not appropriate water for instream uses in the
absence of statutory authority. 131 However, recent decisions in Idaho
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.
129. 247 N.W.2d at 463. For a discussion of the relevant factors in water planning
related to energy, see Harte & EI-Gasseir, Energy and Water, 199 SCIENCE 623 (1978).
130. See Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871.
131. California Trout v. State Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App.3d 816, 153
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and Colarado 8 a indicate that a state may eliminate the actual diver-
sion requirement and declare that instream flow preservation is a
beneficial use and that instream use appropriations do not contra-
vene the constitutional guarantee of the right to appropriate. The
actual diversion and beneficial use requirements functioned to pro-
vide notice to future claimants and to prevent speculation in paper
rights. Both these policies, which still remain valid, can be accom-
plished by other means, and thus there is no need for a per se rule
against instream appropriations. States have the discretion either to
run instream uses through the appropriation system, as have Co-
larado and Idaho, or, as Montana has done, to reserve water for in-
stream uses from the appropriation system.
In Idaho, state filings have been used to preserve selected high
quality trout streams, including "Papa" Hemingway's favorite
stream.88 Instream appropriations in overappropriated Colorado
serve primarily to give the state standing to object to changes in
place of use or point of diversion. The widest use of instream flow
preservation techniques has occurred in Montana, where the state
reservation procedure 8 4 has been used to promote basin-wide ecolog-
ical stability in the Yellowstone Basin. State agencies filed for some
eight million acre-feet per year on some reaches of the Yellowstone,
and the instream claims could have severely constrained energy de-
velopment in the Powder River basin. In 1979, the Board of Natural
Resources issued a final order granting substantial reservations but
not in the full amounts requested. 385
Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979).
132. State Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water Administration, 96
Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974), and Colorado Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water
Conservation Board, - Colo. -, 594 P.2d 570 (1979). See Tarlock, The Recognition of In-
stream Flow Rights-"New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
24-1 (1979).
133. In the Matter of Applications for Permit Nos. 37-7727 and 37-7728 Before the
Director of the Department of Water Resources of the State of Idaho, February 28, 1979.
134. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-2-316 (1978).
135. A final order was issued by the Board of Natural Resources in December of
1978. An appeal of the Board's Powder River reservations has been filed, and sev-
°eral other minor appeals may be filed, but in the main the order is final. Flows were
awarded in percentiles as the Fish and Game Commission claimed the reservations
by percentile claims. For example, a ninety percentile claim is a claim to a flow
which is exceeded in ninety out of 100 years, but not to the ten years of low flow.
Thus, the higher the percentile, the lower the flow reserved in dry years. In general,
the Board granted the Fish and Game Commisson a substantial portion of the
claimed flow in western and central Montana, but decreased the amounts granted in
eastern Montana to allow water for future coal development. For example, the
Commission claimed 4,110,343 acre feet at Billings and the Commission was
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ACQUISITION OF NEw FLOW AND
STORAGE WATER RIGHTS FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
An energy appropriator is like any other appropriator. He must
proceed through the state system to perfect a right, or he must find
the holder of a vested right willing to sell. Congress has made it
clear that water use for coal development should, for the present, be
governed by state law, and revised projections about the impact on
energy development on coal supplies and availability of supplies for
coal conversion suggest that appropriators should neither be afforded
some form of preference nor be specifically constrained from compet-
ing for water rights. A coal developer does have an interest in being
free from constraints which impose costs in excess of benefits on coal
development. Yet this acknowledgement is fraught with controversy,
because many in the West support the present allocation patterns
produced by the law of prior appropriation on the ground that the
present system produces off-balance sheet benefits in the form of a
desirable "way of life." All life is change, and the status quo per se
can never be frozen, but there is force to the argument that the rate
of change is a matter of public concern.
In general, techniques such as comprehensive instream flow res-
ervation procedures are preferred as a means of stabilizing a basin to
ad hoc procedures, which involve great delay and no determinative
outcomes. The western states and the federal government, as the
preceding section illustrates, are moving to put such stabilization
mechanisms in place. This section will examine two areas where the
law of water rights may impose costs in excess of benefits: the doc-
trine of relation back, and possible restrictions on the sale of the
water from Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of Engineers reser-
voirs. The last issue addressed is related to the growing debate about
water conservation. In general, federal and state initiatives toward
conservation will benefit coal development and use because energy
developers are financially better able to bid the new supplies released
by conservation and can better institute water-saving practices to use
available supplies.
granted 3,914,455 at a 75 percentile flow. But, the Commission's claim at Sidney of
8,206,723 acre feet was cut back to 5,492,310 acre feet at an 80 percentile flow less
depletions to Sidney. This leaves 2,667,214 acre feet for a 50 percentile flow unre-
served, 1,034,100 unreserved for a 70 percentile flow, and none reserved or deficits
for eighty percentile flows on up. All reservations were made subject to "all existing
and/or inchoate senior water rights in the source of supply, including but not lim-
ited to federal or Indian reserved rights.
Tarlock, supra note 132, at 24-39.
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A. Relation Back
An appropriation must be completed with due diligence in order
to be vested. If the appropriator proceeds with due diligence, he is
entitled to relate his priority back to the time that the diversion was
commenced. Early case law and statutes imposed short completion
times to discourage speculation. 186 Large municipal and energy
projects require long lead times. Colorado has accommodated the
law of relation back to large municipal and industrial supply projects
through the conditional decree procedure, but in other states energy
appropriations which were not completed because of physical and le-
gal difficulties have been challenged under the due diligence doc-
trine. In a significant precedent, Montana refused to construe a nine-
teenth-century due diligence statute to knock out an energy
appropriation plagued by no end of problems, and in 1973 the state
enacted a statute which gives the state the flexibility to monitor en-
ergy development projects and apply anti-speculative policies, if nec-
essary, in cases of excessive delay.18 7
In construing this statute, the Montana Supreme Court ob-
served that "the fact that the final determination of the validity of
Intake's appropriation may be years away does not place the rights
of the people of Montana or subsequent appropriators in limbo for
an indefinite and open-ended term to any greater extent here than in
the case of any case involving a multi-million dollar project of great
magnitude and complexity. . .," but cautioned that diligence had to
be determined on a case-by-case basis.1 38 Thus, the court made it
clear that in appropriate circumstances the state may conclude that
it is inefficient to preclude the acquisition of present vested rights,
because the possibility of a future higher-valued use of the water
occurring is too remote. In short, the state may conclude that the
opportunity cost of the de facto withdrawal is too high.
136. 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES § 382-85.
137. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 85-2-312 (1979), provides:
The department may limit the time for commencement of the appropriation works,
completion of construction and actual application of the water to the proposed bene-
ficial use. In fixing those time limits, the department shall consider the cost and
magnitude of the project, the engineering and physical features to be encountered,
and, on projects designed for gradual development and gradually increased use of
water, the time reasonably necessary for that gradual development and increased
use. For good cause shown by the permittee, the department may in its discretion
reasonably extend time limits.
138. Montana Dept. of Water Resources and Conservation v. Intake Water Co., 171
Mont. 416, 437, 558 P.2d I110, 1122 (1976).
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B. Sale of Water From Federal Storage Reservoirs
Federal multi-purpose storage reservoirs are an important
source of water for energy development. The primary purpose for the
construction of these reservoirs was for irrigation and flood control,
but many reservoirs, especially in the Upper Missouri basin, have
surplus waters which can be marketed for energy development. The
Secretaries of the Army and Interior apparently have the authority
to sell water for purposes other than irrigation, but the conditions of
such sales are not clear. While the Bureau of Reclamation has gen-
eral statutory authority for surplus water sales, a federal district
court, in a controversy surrounding the sale of water from the Boy-
sen and Yellowtail reservoirs, examined the legislative history of the
project-enabling legislation to determine if the sale for industrial use
would be inconsistent with the primary purpose of the project, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed this approach." ' This has led some to
claim that the authority for the sale of water for new uses must be
found in the authorizing legislation, but no court has expressly so
held.
Another constraint on using water in federal multi-purpose stor-
age reservoirs for energy development may be posed by President
Carter's Water Policy Initiatives. 40 Under these initiatives, federal
agencies may be required to implement water conservation programs
as a condition for industrial and municipal supply contracts from
federal storage reservoirs. Two practitioners have speculated about
the impact of this policy on energy development:
If "development of water conservation programs" is to be a
"condition of contracts for storage or delivery of municipal
and industrial water supplies from federal projects," then it
seems likely that entities such as energy companies analyzing
this water as a possible source of supply will be faced with
contractual conditions affecting the amounts of water which
they may receive from federal projects and the ways in which
that water must be utilized. This situation might make other
139. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979). After
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), which held that § 8 of the Reclamation Act
requires conformity to state law unless such conformity would be clearly inconsistent with
federal policy, states have more discretion to control the allocation of water from federally-
financed reservoirs. However, this discretion will probably not be allowed to be used to frus-
trate federal energy objectives.
140. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,788-37,795 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 37,940-37,961 (1977).
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potential sources of water look relatively more attractive."'
Given that the water supply available for coal development may be
limited, energy companies may be compelled to agree to such
conditions.
C. Water Conservation
Water conservation is a widely proposed strategy for balancing
energy development with other water demands. Conservation poten-
tially allows existing water users to have their demands satisfied at
the same time that new supplies are made available for coal develop-
ment. For this reason, all energy development scenarios stress the
role that conservation can play in meeting the demand for water for
coal conversion at a "price" the region can afford." 2
A conservation agenda is now before the federal government
and the western states. The agenda includes (1) strict enforcement
of existing prohibitions against waste, (2) elimination of custom as a
standard for beneficial use, (3) clarification of the rights of conserv-
ers and elimination of the disincentive to conserve in Colorado cre-
ated by the Shelton Farms opinion," '1 (4) improvement of water
rights transfers within the limits of the vested rights of third par-
ties,"' (5) elimination or reduction of federal subsidies to ensure
that prices charged for water reflect the cost of supply, and (6) the
establishment of water banks which allow temporary or permanent
deposits of water in a bank so that water is available, at a price, for
withdrawal by other users." 5 Despite the recent federal water policy
initiatives, most water conservation measures will be initiated and
implemented by the states, for "reforms can be imposed by Wash-
ington only when they are attached as conditions to hydraulic bribes.
In an age of austerity there is no money for big water projects. '' "16
This is no simple "conservation fix," and all of the conservation
measures will be opposed by those who perceive them to be simply
141. See Hillhouse & Hannay, Practical Implications of the New National Water Pol-
icy, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 221, 229 (1979).
142. Plotkin, Gold, & White, supra note 19.
143. Southeastern Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 187 Colo. 81, 529 P.2d
1321 (1974) holds that the water saved by an upstream appropriator is not free from the call
of the river but rather is part of the pre-existing river regime and thus must be alloted by the
existing schedule of priorities.
144. For a case that imposes excessive restraints on transfers, see Basin Electric Power
Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978).
145. Pring & Tomb, License To Waste: Legal Barriers To Conservation and Efficient
Use of Water in the West, 25 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1 (1979).
146. Richard J. Barnet, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, March, 1980.
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means of taking away water which rightfully and unconditionally be-
longs to the present holder of the water rights. Coal developers will
generally benefit from the imposition of conservation strategies; how-
ever, they can live with existing water use patterns. There is a mar-
ket in water rights, and coal developers are in a favorable position to
bid for available supplies regardless of the ground rules for water
allocation.
CONCLUSION
This Article on coal development and western water suggests
that much of the fears voiced in the West about the water-related
impacts of coal development have been exaggerated. There is no
need for a policy which gives coal development a federal or state
preference, and there is no need for a policy which singles out coal
development and limits the use of water for this purpose. What is
needed is a legal system which establishes clear and rational in-
stream use dedication policies, encourages conservation, and elimi-
nates unjustified constraints which impede the operation of the mar-
ket. 1 7 As a recent observer of the economics of water allocation for
energy development has concluded:
Water availability and uncertainty are greatly overrated as
constraints to energy development. Recall that old western
adage, "Water flows uphill to money." The Intermountain
(electric) Power Project purchased water rights from irriga-
tors in Utah at $1,750/acre-ft., many times greater than the
value of water in crop production. Panhandle Eastern Pipe-
line Company i§ paying all of a $5 million low-interest loan
to repair an irrigation district storage reservoir in exchange
for 25% of reservoir yield, about 5,000 acre-ft/yr. Burlington
Northern and Tenneco propose to develop large irrigation
projects in conjunction with their synthetic fuel operations. It
is not that energy companies can flash "big bucks" around
and get anything they want, but rather that, with some pa-
tience, imagination, and willingness, they can avoid injury to
147. A study by the leading political scientist concerned with western water allocation
problems found that western state voters and legislators are generally unwilling to cut back on
any use of water in the future. The study concludes that since western state legislators seem
unwilling to intervene in the water allocation controversies stimulated by the energy boom.
"crucial decisions will be left to the courts, the executive, special commissions, and negotia-
tions among interest groups or the market." Ingram, Laney & McCain, Water Scarcity and
the Politics of Plenty in the Four Corners States, 32 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY,
298, 299 (1979). For a similar conclusion, see F. TRELEASE, supra note 108, at 216-17.
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third parties or compensate them for damages and otherwise
make a project attractive to a skeptical public . . .'"
148. Abbey, supra note 39, at 11.
